

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: BRITISH POSITION ON EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS

REF: A. NATO 5845 DTG 271755Z OCT 75

----- B. STATE 257089 DTG 300127Z OCT 75

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1. BRITISH EMBASSY OFFICERS (SCOTT AND REEVE) CAME IN

OCTOBER 31 TO GIVE US UK PROPOSED REDRAFT OF PARAS 4-10 OF DRAFT GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP. SCOTT SAID UK DELEGATION WOULD TABLE THIS LANGUAGE AT SPC MEETING ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 3. HE SAID BRITISH REALIZE US WOULD FEEL THAT TABLING THIS LANGUAGE WOULD FURTHER ADD TO SPC CONFUSION. HOWEVER, UK HAD BEEN ASKED BY NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS TO INFORM THEM OF WHAT THE UK HAD IN MIND IN ITS RECENT STATEMENT ON THE SUBJECT. UK FELT THAT THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS WAY FOR ALLIES TO CONSIDER THIS TOPIC WOULD BE TO GIVE CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF WHAT IT HAD IN MIND.

NOT INTEND THIS LANGUAGE TO BECOME THE SUBJECT OF THE ALLIANCE DEBATE. RATHER IT WOULD MERELY GIVE THE ALLIES AN IDEA OF WHAT THE BRITISH WERE PROPOSING.

2. TEXT OF UK REVISION FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT.

---- "PARAGRAPH 4. IN THEIR INITIAL PRESENTATIONS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD AVOID DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF ARMAMENTS LIMITATION.

---- PARAGRAPH 5. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST ON THE NUCLEAR OFFER ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD, AS NECESSARY TO MEET EASTERN PRESSURE, MAKE CLEAR FROM THE OUTSET THAT LIMITATIONS ON NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. THEY MAY ADD AS APPROPRIATE THAT THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS ON NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT WOULD BE THOSE RESULTING FROM COLLECTIVE LIMITATIONS ON ALLIED AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA.

---- PARAGRAPH 6. AS REGARDS LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET EQUIPMENT, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD DRAW AS NECESSARY ON THE POINTS IN PARAS 7-10 BELOW. IN USING THIS MATERIAL THEY SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING GENERAL CONSIDERATION:

(1) THEY SHOULD STRIVE TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON THE BASIC ELEMENTS AS CONTAINED IN PARA 1 ABOVE, AND SHOULD RESIST ALL EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE MAIN OFFER TO SECONDARY ISSUES BY SIDETRACKING THE NEGOTIATIONS INTO MATTERS OF DETAIL.

(2) THEY SHOULD SEEK TO ELICIT AS CONSTRUCTIVE A RESPONSE AS POSSIBLE FROM THE WARSAW PACT TO THE ALLIED OFFER AS A WHOLE, AND SHOULD GIVE EASTERN NEGOTIATORS AS MUCH INFORMATION ON THE QUESTION OF LIMITATIONS AS THEY JUDGE TO

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BE NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE.

---- PARAGRAPH 7. LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THE US NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT (CONTINUE WITH THREE POINTS IN PRESENT PARAGRAPH 6).

---- PARAGRAPH 8. LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN THE AREA OF

REDUCTIONS WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE NUMBER REMAINING AFTER
PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

---- PARAGRAPH 9. US MAIN BATTLE TANKS.SOME CONSTRAINTS
ON THE LEVEL OF US MAIN BATTLE TANKS - IN ORDER TO ENSURE
THAT US TANKS WOULD NOT BE INCREASED IN SUCH A MANNER AS
TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT - COULD BE ACCEPT-
ABLE TO THE WEST AS PART OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT.

---- PARAGRAPH 10. FURTHER DETAILS. IF THE EAST SEEKS
STILL FURTHER DETAILS (CONTINUE AS IN PRESENT PARAGRAPH 9),
END TEXT.

3. MISSION SHOULD DRAW ON EXISTING GUIDANCE IN RESISTING
BRITISH APPROACH. KISSINGER

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